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Horowitz: United States v. Ives

UNITED STATES v. IVES
TESTIFY--Disruptive defendants-defendantswho insist
upon conducting themselves in a disorderly and disrespectful
manner at trial may lose their opportunity to take the stand. 504
F.2d 935 (2d Cir. 1974)

RIGHT TO

The problems created by disruptive defendants in criminal
trials have probably existed since the establishment of a system
for the administration of justice. The true dimensions of this
phenomenon and its ramifications for society as a whole, however, have been brought to light by several highly charged and
much publicized trials which have taken place since the late nineteen sixties.' A recent Ninth Circuit decision, United States v.
Ives, 2 poses a serious challenge to the constitutional boundaries
previously laid down by the Supreme Court to delineate the permissible discretion afforded a trial judge in handling obstreperous
defendants. The Ninth Circuit held that a defendant whose
courtroom demeanor is sufficiently disorderly and offensive may
be deemed to have waived the opportunity to testify in his own
3
defense.
In Ives, the petitioner was tried for murder on an Indian
Reservation.' His first trial ended in a mistrial due to his continual disruptions of the proceedings. The second trial judge, in
preparing for trial, read the transcripts of the first proceeding and
conferred with the first presiding judge. In an effort to prevent a
second mistrial, the second judge took certain precautions which
included the installation of special audio equipment in the courtroom and in a cell directly below it so that Ives could follow the
progress of his trial in the event that it became necessary to
remove him from the courtroom. In addition, special telephones
1. The two cases which were most responsible for focusing public attention on the
problem of disorderly trials were the so called "Chicago Seven" conspiracy trial, United
States v. Dellinger, (N.D. Ill. Crim. No. 69CR180, 1969), rev'd, 472 F.2d 340 (7th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970 (1973); and the New York Black Panther case, People v.
Cain (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1970), aff'd, 38 App. Div.2d 900, 330 N.Y.S.2d 973 (1st Dep't
1972). For a full discussion of the problem in general, see N. DORSEN & L. FRIEDMAN,
DISORDER IN THE COURT 3-9 (1st ed. 1973) [hereinafter referred to as DISORDER].
2. 504 F.2d 935 (9th Cir. 1974).
3. The court also ruled on three subsidiary points involving jurisdictional issues and
the question of the particular defendant's mental competency to stand trial. However,
these issues have no bearing on the constitutional considerations which are the subject
matter of this note, and will not be further discussed.
4. Such an offense is a violation of federal law under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111, 1153 (1970).
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(with blinking lights rather than bells) were installed in the cell
and at defense counsel's table so that Ives could communicate
with his attorneys during every stage of the proceedings.
Ives continuously disrupted his second trial in substantially
the same manner as he previously had done, refusing to answer
questions, shouting obscenities at the judge and jurors, and violently attacking both his own and opposing counsel. As a result,
he was removed from the courtroom to the special cell on numerous occasions. Specifically, Ives was given the opportunity to take
the stand on three separate occasions, and in every instance he
refused to cooperate either with his own lawyer or with the judge.
On the first and second occasions, the judge removed Ives from
the courtroom. On the third occasion, an extended confrontation
between Ives and the trial judge took place. Although Ives was not
removed from the courtroom at this time, his attorney assumed
that he was not going to take the stand and proceeded to call
another witness. Following a physical attack by petitioner on the
United States attorneys, however, he was removed from the
courtroom for the last time and was not permitted to return despite repeated requests by his lawyers that he be permitted to
return in order to testify.5 Ives was subsequently convicted of
murder.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction, holding first that a defendant's right to testify in his own
behalf can be waived by his obstreperous conduct during the
trial; 6 second, that what type of conduct constitutes disruption
and what measures should be taken to control it are committed
to the discretion of the trial judge;7 and third, that before a waiver
of the right to testify can be found, the defendant must be made
aware of the consequences of his behavior.'
The court advanced three major arguments in support of its
conclusion. First, the opinion stated that a unique set of historical
circumstances had, in effect, made the question of whether or not
the Constitution guaranteed a defendant in a criminal action the
right to testify one of first impression with little if any direct
authority on which to rely in reaching a decision. The common
law rules of evidence had traditionally precluded defendants from
5. 504 F.2d 935, 944 (9th Cir. 1974).
6. Id. at 941.

7. Id. at 942.
8. Id.
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testifying on their own behalf.' In addition, no specific mention
was made of a right to testify in the Constitution itself. The court
maintained that if the opportunity to testify was, in fact,
grounded in the Constitution, then the source of this guarantee
must necessarily be the due process clause of the fifth amendment. The court pointed out, however, that assuming that this
constitutional right to testify does exist, it has been largely ignored because of the enactment by Congress in 1878 of a statute
recognizing defendants as competent witnesses.1' Since the opportunity to testify was protected by statute, the courts were not
required to confront the question of whether or not this right was
independently guaranteed by the Constitution.
Second, the court stated that there has been a considerable
amount of judicial uncertainty as to whether the opportunity of
a defendant to testify is a right, or merely a privilege which,
presumably, carries less weight." The court concluded that it was
unnecessary to make this distinction, for even if it is assumed
that the testimonial opportunity is a right and not a privilege,
and that it is independently protected by the fifth amendment,
the right must nevertheless be claimed by an attempt to take the
stand or it will be deemed to have been waived.' 2 The court concluded that the petitioner's conduct was sufficiently objectionable to constitute a waiver of his opportunity to testify whether
such opportunity was a right or a privilege, and whether it was
protected by the Contitution or merely secured by statute.'3 However, the court did take cognizance of prior case law to the effect
that a waiver of a right or privilege guaranteed by the Constitution will be measured against a higher standard than a similar
right or privilege which is merely secured by statute. 4
Third, the court took notice of a similar Second Circuit case,
9. See text accompanying notes 19-24 infra.
10. 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1970) provides:
In trial of all persons charged with the commission of offenses against the
United States and in all proceedings in courts martial and courts of inquiry in
any State, District, Possession, or Territory, the person charged shall, at his own
request, be a competent witness. His failure to make such request shall not
create any presumption against him.
The original statute, enacted in 1878, is virtually identical to this amended version which

was adopted in 1948.
11.
12.
13.
14.

504 F.2d 935 (9th Cir. 1974).
Id.
Id. at 941.
Id. at 940, citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
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United States v. Bentvena,'5 wherein a disruptive defendant also
had been denied the opportunity to take the stand. The circuit
court's decision in Bentvena indicated that, while the opportunity to testify might conceivably be waived by a defendant's courtroom demeanor, the behavior of the particular petitioner before
it did not call for such a conclusion. Consequently, it was held
that such denial of the defendant's opportunity to testify constituted proper grounds for reversal.
The Ives court further noted the decision of Illinois v. Allen,'
handed down by the Supreme Court subsequent to Bentvena. In
Allen a test for constitutional balancing was established: a defendant will be deemed to have waived his right to be present in the
courtroom if his conduct is so disorderly and disrespectful of the
court that the proceedings cannot be effectively carried on while
he remains present.'7 Allen also held that the determination of
what types of behavior might lead to the conclusion that a defen'dant has waived his opportunity to be present is within the discretion of the trial judge.'" The Ives court applied the Allen test
to the fact situation in Bentvena in reasoning that a defendant
can waive his right to testify by his conduct in substantially the
same manner as he can waive his right to be present in the court9
room.'

The ConstitutionalDimensions of the Defendant's Opportunity
to Testify
The Ives court referred to the fact that defendants in criminal actions had not always been permitted to testify personally
in American courts." This practice was not, however, a function
of any of the constitutional issues that were considered by the Ives
court. Rather, it was a carry-over from the English common law
rules of evidence which deemed a defendant in a criminal prose15. 319 F.2d 916 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, sub noma. Ormento v. United States, 375 U.S.
940 (1963), rehearing denied, 397 U.S. 928 (1970).
16. 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
17. Id. at 343.
18. Id.
19. 504 F.2d 93b, 941 (9th Cir. 1974).
20. For a complete discussion of the historical development of the English common
law rules of incompetency and its effect on the American judicial system, see J. WioMoRE,
A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TIuALs AT COMMON LAW § 579
(3d ed. 1940); Popper, History and Development of the Accused's Right to Testily, 1962
WASH. U.L.Q. 454.
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cution incompetent to offer testimony because of his overwhelming interest in the outcome.21 Due to his interest, it was presumed
that a defendant's personal testimony was not reliable. 22 In addition:2n
It was thought that competency would be more harmful than
helpful to the accused since the jury might infer guilt if he then
refused to take the stand, while cross examiniation might place
him in a situation where even an innocent man might appear
at a disadvantage if he did testify.
Thus, prior to Congressional enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 3481,4 in
1878, recognizing defendants as competent witnesses in federal
courts, the rules of incompetency which had characterized the
English common law were the predominant force in the American
judicial system as well.25
The constitutional origins of the right of a criminal defendant to take the stand, to which the court hypothetically alluded, 2 are found in the due process clause of the fifth amendment. In Galpin v. Page,2 the Supreme Court enunciated a principle which has remained essentially unchanged for over a century, and which is to this day the basis of the claim that the
opportunity of a criminal defendant to offer testimony is constitutionally protected:n
It is a rule as old as the law. . . that no one shall be personally
bound until he has had his day in court, by which is meant, until
he has been duly cited to appear, and has been afforded an
opportunity to be heard. Judgment without such citation and
opportunity wants all the attributes of a judicial determination;
it is judicial usurpation and oppression, and can never be upheld where justice is justly administered (emphasis added).
21. Id. at 456.

22. Id.
23. United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916, 943 (2d Cir. 1963).
24. See note 10 supra for the text of 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1970).
25. Popper, History and Development of the Accused's Right to Testify, 1962 WASH.
U.L.Q. 454, 456.
26. 504 F.2d 935, 939 (9th Cir. 1974).
27. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 350 (1873).
28. Id. at 368-69 (dictum). Many subsequent decisions by the Supreme Court have
echoed the principle that a defendant's opportunity to be heard is an essential element of
due process. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68, 71 (1932); cf. Blackmer v.
United States, 284 U.S. 421, 440 (1932); Holmes v. Conway, 241 U.S. 624 (1916); Frank
v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 326 (1915); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 106, 111 (1908);
Rogers v. Peck, 199 U.S. 425, 435 (1905).
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9 the Court again acknowledged
In Snyder v. Massachusetts,"
the overriding significance of a defendant's opportunity to defend
himself, stating that "[a] defendant who has been denied the
opportunity to be heard in his defense has lost something indispensable, however convincing the ex parte showing."3
This precise notion, that due process requires that a criminal
defendant be afforded the opportunity to present a defense, was
reiterated by the Court in strikingly similar language seventy-five
years after the Galpinopinion in the case of In re Oliver,3' wherein
32
it was held that:

[Flailure to afford the petitioner a reasonable opportunity to
defend himself against the charge

. . .

was a denial of due pro-

cess of law. A person's right to reasonable notice of a charge
against him and an opportunity to be heard in his defense-a
right to his day in court-are basic in our system of jurisprudence, and these rights include, as a minimum, a right to examine witnesses against him, to offer testimony, and to be represented by counsel (emphasis added).
It is particularly significant to note that the Court in Oliver carefully delineated that which was merely generally alluded to in
Galpin, setting out those elements which were considered to be
the minimum essentials of a defendant's "day in court," including specifically the right to offer testimony.
In decisions subsequent to Oliver, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly referred, either expressly or by implication, to the
right of a criminal defendant to offer testimony as being of constitutional dimensions, stating most emphatically in Brooks v.
Tennessee33 that "[w]hether the defendant is to testify is an
important tactical decision as well as a matter of constitutional
right." In Morrissey v. Brewer,3 the Court was confronted with
the question of whether or not the protections of the due process
clause which apply to a defendant in a criminal prosecution similarly apply to a parolee at a revocation hearing. The Court proceeded from the premise that the parolee was not entitled to "the
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

291 U.S. 97 (1934).
Id. at 116.
333 U.S. 257 (1948).
Id. at 273.
406 U.S. 605 (1972).
Id. at 612.

35. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
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full panoply of rights due a defendant,"36 but nevertheless, decided that one of the basic procedural safeguards afforded to the
parolee, even under this lesser standard, was an "opportunity to
be heard in person."3 The logical extension of this line of reasoning would certainly seem to be, by implication, that this same
opportunity must also be afforded to the criminal defendant. In
less specific terms, the Court recently held in Chambers v.
Mississippi,3"citing Oliver, that the right of a defendant to pres39
ent a defense is a fundamental element of due process.
In Poe v. United States, 0 the Federal District Court for the
District of Columbia advanced perhaps the most definitive
explication of the principles announced in Oliver. The court held
that:"
An accused in a criminal trial in federal court has the right
to testify in his own behalf. This right is guaranteed and protected by the fifth and sixth amendments to the Constitution
and by federal statute 18 U.S.C. § 3481 ....
The right to testify is a basic right ....
Citing Poe in United States v. Looper,2 the Fourth Circuit stated
that "[t]he right to testify has been described as a constitutional
right. . . . Certainly, in a federal court, it is not less than a
statutory right, and it may not be denied a defendant if, being
advised, he elects to exercise it.""4 Similarly, the District of Columbia Circuit stated in dictum in United States v. McCord4 4 that
"as a matter of law, a defendant is always vouchsafed the constitutional right to testify."4
Waiver of the Right to Testify?
In arriving at its decision that petitioner Ives had, by his
contumacious conduct during his trial, waived his right to take
the stand, the court applied the standard for handling disruptive
defendants established by the Supreme Court in Illinois v.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 480.
Id. at 489.
410 U.S. 284 (1973).
Id. at 294.
233 F. Supp. 173 (D.D.C. 1964).
Id. at 176.
419 F.2d 1405 (4th Cir. 1969).
Id. at 1406.
420 F.2d 255 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
Id. at 257.
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Alien." Allen was tried for armed robbery and was proceeding pro
se. Upon numerous occasions he verbally abused the trial judge,
which led to his eventual expulsion from the courtroom. In approving of the trial judge's decision to remove Allen, the Court
stated: 7
[W]e explicitly hold today that a defendant can lose his right
to be present at trial if, after he has been warned by the judge
that he will be removed if he continues his disruptive behavior,
he nevertheless insists on conducting himself in a manner so
disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that his
trial cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom.
The Ives court stated that the Allen holding, which dealt
with the right of a defendant to be present at trial, was equally
applicable to the case at hand which involved a defendant's opportunity to testify. 8 Moreover, the court suggested that had
Allen been decided prior to, rather than after United States v.
Bentvena,49 a case in which the material issue was essentially
identical to the issue in Ives (the denial of a defendant's right to
testify), the outcome of the Bentvena decision might have been
different."
There appears to be a serious fault in the decision reached
by the Ninth Circuit. The Ives court grafted the Allen standard,
which was formulated with respect to a defendant's right to be
present at trial, onto a fact pattern which involved the denial of
an entirely distinguishable and fundamentally more significant
right-the opportunity of a defendant to offer testimony in his
own behalf. The receipt of the defendant's testimony was not an
issue in Allen.'
There are certain aspects of a prosecution which arguably
can, if absolutely necessary, proceed in the defendant's absence
without -an enormous risk of prejudice." Where a defendant's
46. 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
47. Id. at 343.
48. 504 F.2d 935, 941 (9th Cir. 1974).
49. 319 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied sub nom. Ormento v. United States, 375
U.S. 940 (1963), rehearingdenied, 397 U.S. 928 (1970). See notes 14-18 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the court's synthesis of Bentvena and Allen.
50. 504 F.2d 935, 942 (9th Cir. 1974).
51. Allen was excluded from the courtroom during voir dire and during the presentation of the prosecution's case-in-chief but was present throughout the presentation of his
own defense. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 340-41 (1970).
to be present
52. "[I]n a prosecution for a felony the defendant has the privilege ..
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opportunity to tell his own version of the facts to the jury is

involved, however, there is probably no other phase of the proceeding which requires more vigilant and judicious protection.
Recognizing that a defendant's opportunity to offer testimony is
an integral element of his right to present a defense,53 the Supreme Court has stated that the very integrity of the fact finding
process itself is seriously called into question by a "denial or
significant diminution"54 of the exercise of that right. Thus the
standard established in Allen for handling disruptive defendants
should not be mechanically applied in the Ives-type case where
the loss of an entirely different and essentially more significant
right is contemplated.
Alternatives: Civil Contempt and Deposing the Defendant
It may arguably be asserted that Ives abused his right to
testify personally. However, the apparent constitutional guarantee of the right to testify, the particular significance of that right,
and the severity of the penalties facing Ives upon conviction of
murder should have dictated a search for alternative procedures
which could have ensured Ives' right, while preserving decorum
in the court. There are at least two acceptable alternatives to
expulsion of a disorderly defendant from the courtroom which the
Ives court could have attempted to utilize. Indeed the first, citing
the defendant in civil contempt, was specifically approved of in
Allen.5
The contempt power has long been recognized by the courts
as a judicial weapon against parties who, by their actions, effecin his own person whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial to the
fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge." Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97, 105-06 (1934). In distinguishing between those phases of a criminal prosecution
which would require a defendant to be present and those aspects which would not, the
Snyder court states that a defendant must be present at any phase where he would be in
a position to help his attorney to represent him, (id. at 106), but that on other occasions
where his presence adds nothing to the quality of his defense, his presence is not required,
for example at pre-trial and post-trial motion hearings. Id. at 107. The Court specifically
held that a defendant did not have an absolute right to be present at a jury view of the
scene of a crime. Id. at 122. The essential thrust of the opinion is well illustrated by the
statement of Mr. Justice Cardozo: "This Court has not yet held that even upon a trial in
court, the absence of a defendant for a few moments while formal documents are marked
in evidence will vitiate a judgment." Id. at 117.
53. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406
U.S. 605, 613 (1972); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948).
54. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973).
55. 397 U.S. 337, 344-45 (1970).
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tively disrupt legal proceedings. In Ex parte Robinson,5 6 the Supreme Court stated that:5 7
The power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts; its
existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial
proceedings, and to the enforcement of the judgments, orders,
and writs of the courts, and consequently to the due administration of justice.
As early as 1812, the Court spoke of the contempt power as a
means of controlling disrespectful conduct stating, in United
States v. Hudson,5" that "[t]o fine for contempt, imprison for
contumacy, enforce the observance of order, etc., are powers
which cannot be dispensed with in a court because they are necessary to the exercise of all others."5 9 Similarly, in Anderson v.
Dunn,'"the Court stated in reference to the use of the contempt
power that "courts of justice are universally acknowledged to be
vested, by their very creation with power to impose silence, reI
spect and decorum in their presence. ....
These early judicial assertions that the contempt power
could be used to contain acts of disrespect for the court referred
to criminalcontempt, essentially as a punishment of the individual who had committed the disrespectful act. Unlike criminal
contempt, civil contempt is not designed as a punitive sanction,
but rather, as an inducement to the individual to conduct himself
in a particular manner.2 This distinction is well explained by the
Supreme Court in Gompers v. Bucks Store and Range
3
Company:1
[I]mprisonment for civil contempt is ordered where the defendant has refused to do an affirmative act required by the provisions of an order which, either in form or substance, was mandatory in its character. Imprisonment in such cases is not inflicted
as a punishment, but is intended to be remedial by coercing the
defendant to do what he had refused to do. The decree in such
cases is that the defendant stand committed unless and until he
performs the affirmative act required by the court's order.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505 (1873).
Id. at 510.
11 U.S. (7 Cranch.) 32 (1812).
Id. at 34.
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821).
Id. at 226.
See generally DISORDER, supra note 1, at 102-05.
221 U.S. 418, 442 (1911).
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It is evident from the language used by the Court that the
civil contempt power was, at the outset, contemplated to be used
in order to compel an individual to perform an affirmative act,
rather than to refrain from behaving in a disruptive manner.
Moreover, it appears that prior to the Allen decision, the use of
civil contempt as a method of handling disruptive defendants had
not been considered.6 4 Despite the lack of precedent for the use
of civil contempt in this manner, the Allen court stated: 5
Another aspect of the contempt remedy is the judge's power,
when exercised consistently with state and federal law, to imprison an unruly defendant such as Allen for civil contempt and
discontinue the trial until such time as the defendant promises
to behave himself.
In effect, what the civil contempt remedy does is to confine
the obstreperous defendant to prison while he "thinks it over."
The uniqueness of this approach lies in the fact that individuals
so confined "carry the keys to their prison in their own pockets".66
The civil contempt remedy would seem to be a highly effective
approach toward controlling the behavior of all but the most
uncooperative defendants.6 7 In any event, it does not appear from
the record that the trial judge in Ives at any point attempted to
use this sanction. Rather, it is stated in the opinion that the judge
threatened Ives with expulsion after only the first interruption in
the proceedings, during voir dire.6" At the very least, in consideration of both the importance of the defendant's right to testify, and
the severe penalties facing him upon conviction for murder, it
would seem a fair conclusion that the judge should have attempted the contempt remedy before permanently excluding Ives
from the courtroom.
Admittedly, the point may be reached where a disruptive
defendant, unconvinced by citation for civil contempt, may have
to be excluded from his own trial so that the proceedings can be
64. See DisoRDE, supra note 1, at 102-03.
65. 397 U.S. 337, 344-45 (1970).
66. In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461 (8th Cir. 1902).
67. The effectiveness of the civil contempt remedy is limited in that any prolonged
confinement of the defendant would necessitate releasing the jury. However, the trial
judge in Ives was presented with an excellent opportunity to test the effectiveness of this
course of action when the defendant disrupted the proceedings during voir dire, before the
jury had been empanelled. See note 66 supraand accompanying text.
68. 504 F.2d 935, 942-43 (9th Cir. 1974).
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effectively carried on. However, a second alternative approach
exists which a trial judge might explore in the interest of preserving a defendant's right to have his own testimony offered in evidence: the taking of the defendant's deposition.
The 1970 Congressional enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 3503, as
part of the Organized Crime Control Act, significantly broadened
the circumstances under which depositions could be taken for use
in criminal prosecutions. Prior to the enactment of § 3503, Rule
15(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure had allowed a
deposition to be taken only upon a showing that (1) "a prospective witness may be unable to attend or prevented from attending
a trial or hearing," (2) "that his testimony is material," and (3)
"that it is necessary to take his deposition in order to prevent a
failure of justice. . .

."

While Ives' testimony might have been

permitted to have been taken under the old federal rule, the more
general and flexible standard adopted by the new statute would
certainly appear susceptible of favorable interpretation in the
case of disorderly defendants. Section 3503(a) provides in significant part:69
Whenever due to exceptional circumstances it is in the interest
of justice that the testimony of a prospective witness of a party
be taken and preserved, the court at any time after the filing of
an indictment or information may upon motion of such party
and notice to the parties order that the testimony of such witness be taken by deposition. .

.

.(emphasis added).

Two additional changes in the rules governing depositions
which were made by the enactment of § 3503 further highlight
this alternative approach as being particularly well suited to application in the Ives case. First, subsection (f) of the statute provides specifically for the taking of a witness' deposition in a criminal proceeding if "the witness refuses in the trial or hearing to
testify concerning the subject of the deposition or part offered."7
It is clear that Ives' refusal on three separate occasions to cooperate with the judge and his own lawyers in their attempts to elicit
his testimony7' would bring the instant case under the purview of
subsection (f). Second, unlike Rule 15, subsection (d)of the new
statute specifically makes mention of taking the deposition of a
69. 18 U.S.C. § 3503(a) (1970).
70. 18 U.S.C. § 3503(f) (1970).
71. 504 F.2d 935, 943-44 (9th Cir. 1974).
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party defendant,7 2 thus bringing Ives within the meaning of "witness" as referred to in subsections (a) and (f).
What emerges from the foregoing discussion is that the trial
judge should have explored the possibilities of either the civil
contempt remedy or taking the petitioner's testimony by deposition in order to have afforded him the greatest, rather than the
least possible protection under the Constitution and federal law.
It would certainly seem reasonable to conclude that in failing to
consider these alternatives to the expulsion of Ives from his own
trial and doing nothing further, the trial judge chose an extreme,
if not unwarranted course of action.
Conclusion
In handing down its decision in Ives, it is clear that the Ninth
Circuit committed several serious errors. First, it failed to properly recognize the fundamental importance of a defendant's
right to personally offer testimony, a right which goes to the very
heart of the fact-finding process. Second, it adopted and applied
to the instant case a standard for dealing with disorderly defendants which was established in reference to an entirely different
and less significant right, i.e., the right to be present at every
stage of one's own trial. Third, the court failed to explore any
alternative courses of action which the trial judge might have
pursued in preference to the ultimate sanction of expulsion from
the courtroom.
Mark M. Horowitz
72. 18 U.S.C. § 3503(d)(1) (1970) provides: "in no event shall a deposition be taken
of a party defendant without his consent" [emphasis added].
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